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CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF




S INCE 1980, MANY corporate takeovers and restructuring ac-
tivities have developed within and across companies, and de-
veloping countries have stimulated the consolidation of
corporations, improved the management of corporations, and
rearranged the distribution of wealth and resources.' The
forces pushing these activities forward have been national and
international deregulation, new information and communica-
tion technologies, globalization, the opening of emerging econ-
omies and traditionally closed economies, and the rescuing of
the deteriorating economic sectors.
Generally speaking, takeovers are consistent with corporate
governance boosting productivity and giving the corporation
managers an incentive to work hard to increase corporate value.
The faster the economies of the developing countries modern-
ize and privatize, the greater the chance of transactional owner-
ship and more active operation of business entities. Also,
takeovers are a useful and important tool for creating these
ends, especially for a developing economy like China.
China's economy used to be traditionally socialist and highly
centralized. By opening China's economy to the outside world,
takeovers in China have become important in its economic re-
* Ph.D. candidate, Leiden University, the Netherlands; former general
counsel of the Legal Advisory Office of China Eastern Airlines, 1995-1998. The
views expressed in this article are entirely personal. E-mail: Jianduanwu@
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** L.L.M., Leiden University, the Netherlands; currently Deacons, Shanghai.
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I See B. Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity
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structuring and have drawn much attention. Recently, China
declared the Scheme of Restructure for nine major airlines di-
rectly under General Administration of Civil Aviation of China
(CAAC), which is essentially a takeover among those airlines.
The three biggest airlines in China, Air China (a wholly State-
owned company), Eastern Air Group Company (a majority
share holding company of China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd.),
and Southern Air Group Company (a majority share holding
company of China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd.), will take over
the other six airlines. These takeovers among China's airlines
are good examples for understanding the takeover legislation
and takeover practice in China.
A variety of laws affect takeovers, including the company law,
antitrust (competition) law, securities law, and other regula-
tions. This article first discusses the definition and scope of
takeovers. Then it briefly discusses European Community (EC)
competition law, American antitrust law, as well as China's anti-
unfair competition law, company law, and securities law.
The abolition of international frontiers enables firms in the
Community to embark on new activities and enables Commu-
nity consumers to benefit from increased competition.2 As EC
competition law is applicable in the Member States, 3 it is worthy
to focus on EC competition law. Community law preempts the
national laws of the Member States when conflicts arise between
national and Community competition law. The simultaneous
application of law must be resolved in accordance with the prin-
ciple of the precedence of Community law.4 Therefore, the na-
tional competition laws of the Member States will not be
discussed in this article.
Thus far, China has promulgated Anti-Unfair Competition
laws and some other regulations; however, China still needs to
improve its competition law to create a legal environment for
competition. Therefore, this paper discusses China's competi-
2 See Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and Commission in Ap-
plying Article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 O.J. (C039) 0006-0011.
3 Article 10 (former Article 5) of the EC Treaty provides that Member States
shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure ful-
fillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action
taken by the institution of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement
of the Community's tasks. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov.
10, 1997, O.J. (C340) [hereinafter EC TRErATY].
4 See Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, (1969) E.C.R. 1; Joint Cases




tion law and regulations. Furthermore, because the takeovers
among the Chinese airlines are closely related with China's com-
pany law and securities law, this paper also discusses each of
these. In addition, this paper explores takeover cases in the
United States (U.S.) and Europe. As the takeovers among Chi-
nese airlines have strong governmental involvement, a brief in-
troduction of the U.S. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and its
effects are discussed to better understand the takeovers among
the Chinese airlines.
II. TAKEOVER: DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE
The term "takeover" must be defined. Black's Law Dictionary
defines the word "takeover" as follows: "The acquisition of own-
ership or control of a corporation. A takeover is typically ac-
complished by a purchase of shares or assets, a tender offer, or a
merger. 5
Takeovers are common in the market economy. Takeovers
can be divided into two types: takeovers through the public se-
curities market, and takeovers through non-public securities.6
Public takeovers generate significant opportunities for investors
to make a profit. Takeovers also allow the market to discipline
errant management and allow productive wealth to shift to high-
valued uses. As for a non-security-market, takeovers can be used
both in well-developed capital markets and less developed capi-
tal markets.
Takeovers can also be divided into: (1) a friendly takeover
that is approved by the target corporation's board of directors;
and (2) a hostile takeover that is resisted by the target corpora-
tion's board of directors.7 In terms of scope, a "takeover" is
larger than both a "merger" and an "acquisition."8 For example,
in addition to a merger and an acquisition, a takeover can also
be accomplished through a management buyout (MBO) or a
5 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1466 (7th ed. 1999).
6 See CORPORATE TAKEOVERs THROUGH THE PUBLIC MARKETS 3 (Phaedon John
Kozyris ed. 1996).
Id.
8 Other approaches might be unsolicited merger proposals to directors, accu-
mulations of shares in the open market, or proxy fights seeking to install new
directors.
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leverage buyout (LBO). Some argue that takeovers parallel
mergers and acquisitions?'
Under most circumstances, a merger and an acquisition occur
between two corporations in the same industry. The scope of
takeovers is wider than the scope of a merger or an acquisition.
For example, a takeover might also include an LBO. An LBO
adjusts the mix of the debt and equity contracts within a corpo-
ration, where investors purchase the stock of a corporation and
retire most of it.'I By doing this, they can control the day-to-day
affairs of the corporation, at least indirectly, through their
power to vote on the retention of management.
In the European Union (E.U.), when exploring takeovers
from the angle of competition law and regulations, another
word, "concentration," might be used to describe the process of
a "takeover." A concentration shall be deemed to arise where:
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or
(b) one or more person already controlling at least one under-
taking, or one or more undertakings acquire, whether by
purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other
means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of
one or more other undertakings."
In this article, the term "merger," used in the context of the
takeover of one corporation by another, means the absorption
of one corporation that ceases to exist into another corporation
that retains its own name and identity and acquires the assets
and liabilities of the former. The term "acquisition" in the same
context means gaining possession or control over another cor-
poration's assets or shares.1 2 However, sometimes words like
takeover, merger, and acquisition might be used interchangea-
bly in this article.
As the takeovers among the Chinese airlines are strongly in-
fused with governmental involvement, the authors of this article
9 For example, George Bittlingmayer, professor of The Management Graduate
School of Management University of California, Davis. See GEORGE BIT-
TLINGMAYER, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1999).
10 See BARRY E. ADLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, DEBT, LEVERAGE BUYOUTS, AND COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (1989).
l" See Council Regulation 4064/89 on Control of Concentration Between Un-
dertakings, 1990 o.J. (L257) 13, art. 3.1.
12 Investors are always looking out for companies that are likely to be acquired,
because those who want to acquire such companies are often willing to pay more
than the market price for the shares they need to complete the acquisition. See
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVEST-
MENT TERMS 7 (5th ed. 1998).
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refer to these takeovers as "administrative mandate takeovers."
For purposes of this article, takeovers include, but are not lim-
ited to, friendly takeovers (including mergers and acquisitions
through agreements) and administrative mandate takeovers.
The discussion on takeovers in this article focuses on friendly
and administrative mandate takeovers rather than hostile take-
overs. Hence, this article does not cover the legislation on hos-
tile takeovers.
III. TAKEOVERS AND EC COMPETITION LAW, U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW, AND CHINESE COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY
Takeovers can occur when two or more corporations decide
to consolidate or merge their businesses into a single firm. This
kind of takeover is called a friendly takeover. Among airlines,
there are two main considerations that might impede takeovers:
1) competition law concerned with preventing the undue con-
centration of enterprises, which may lead to the distortion of
competition; or 2) abuse of dominant position in the market.
A. TAKEov-ERs UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW
1. EC Competition Law
Antitrust (competition) law was created to regulate the do-
mestic market.1 3 In the European Union, competition law is
concretely considered as the set of rules and disciplines to real-
ize the internal unified market and the free movement of goods,
persons, and capital. The laws, maintained by the European
Commission and the Member States, relate to agreements be-
tween firms that restrict competition, or the abuse of a domi-
nant position, such as attempts to create a monopoly position
through takeovers by acquisition or merger.
EC competition law is reflected in Article 81 (former Article
85) and Article 82 (former Article 86) of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty"). These two articles
prohibit the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
and the abuse of a dominant position in the EC market. 4 In
addition, there are some commission or council regulations to
implement the principles as set up by Articles 81 and 82, which
13 See ALFRED F. CROrrI, TRADING UNDER EEC AND US ANTITRUST LAws 1
(1997).
14 EC TREATY, supra note 3, at arts. 81, 82.
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will be mentioned in a latter part of this section. Articles 81 and
82 are the cornerstones of EC competition law. Article 81 is the
first operative provision of the EC Treaty, ensuring that compe-
tition in the internal market is not distorted. 15 Article 82 pro-
hibits abusive exploitation of the dominant position from one or
more undertakings. 16
Agreements and concerted practices, which may prevent, re-
strict, or distort competition, can be divided into two broad sub-
sets: horizontal and vertical arrangements. A horizontal
agreement is an agreement between two or more competitors at
the same level of supply. Basically, it is an agreement between
direct competitors to fix prices or to share markets. 17 It can
arise in the form of a cartel agreement, a price fixing agree-
ment, a production quota, or a market sharing agreement. Hor-
izontal cartel arrangements are the main target of Article 81 of
the EC Treaty. This is clear from the first three examples pro-
vided in Article 81 (1), which prevent, restrict, or distort compe-
tition from this type of agreement. 8
Article 81(2) provides that any agreement or decision prohib-
ited pursuant to Article 81 shall automatically be void.1 9 How-
ever, Article 81(3) considers some agreements and decisions
that do not prevent, restrict, or distort competition, and are
thus, not prohibited by EC law.20
There are two recent EC regulations that relate to horizontal
agreements. One is Regulation 2658/2000, effective on Novem-
ber 19, 2000, which discusses the application of Article 81(3) of
the EC Treaty to categories of specialization agreements. The
other is Regulation 2659/2000, effective on November 29, 2000,
which discusses the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty
to categories of research and development agreements.
The elements may be present in vertical arrangements as
well. 2 ' A vertical agreement is an agreement between competi-
tors at different levels on the economic chain, such as, between
a producer of raw materials and a manufacturer, a manufacturer
15 Id. at art. 81(1).
16 Id. at art. 82.
17 See REBERT LANE, EC COMPETITION LAW 82 (2000).
18 EC TREATY, supra note 3, at art. 81(1).
19 Id. at art. 82.
20 Id. at art. 81(3). For example, any agreement or decision that contributes to
improving production or distribution, or promotes progress in technology and




and a distributor, a distributor and a retailer, a retailer and a
customer, or any variation within these distinctions..2 2 The com-
mon types of vertical agreements include exclusive distribution
agreements, exclusive purchasing agreements, franchising
agreements, licensing agreements and resale price maintenance
agreements.
Two EC regulations relating to vertical agreements also exist.
Regulation 240/1996, effective on January 31, 1996, deals with
certain categories of technology transfer agreements. Regula-
tion 2790/1999, effective on December 22, 1999, makes a de-
tailed category of vertical agreements and concerned practices.
Article 82 of the EC Treaty is intended to prohibit the abuse
of a dominant position, and it points out that a dominant com-
petitor has the responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not
impair or diminish competition in the common market.23 Such
abuse, according to Article 82, may consist of imposing unfair
purchase or selling prices, unfair trading conditions, applying
different transaction conditions with trading parties, and mak-
ing the conclusion of contracts subject to supplementary and
irrelevant delegations.24
In air transportation, either domestic or international, the ec-
onomic value of traffic rights is conferred by the doctrine of sov-
ereignty, or is dealt with in a bilateral framework.25 National
carriers usually enjoy a dominant position in a particular na-
tional air market, as well as within their own extensive networks.
The regulatory environment in air transportation may easily
make an air carrier fall into a dominant position in a particular
market.
In 1962, the EC Council adopted Regulation No. 17/6226 to
implement Articles 81 and 82, directing the EC Commission to
apply EC competition law in all industries. However, due to the
distinctive features of the transport industry, the EC Council
adopted Council Regulation No. 141/62 in an attempt to ex-
22 See REBERT LANE, EC COMPETITION LAw 92 (2000).
23 See Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm'n of European Cmtys., (1983) E.C.R.
3461.
24 EC TREATY, supra note 3, at art. 82.
25 See H.A.Wassenbergh, Substantial Ownership and Effective Control, Public
International Air Law, Part 2 Syllabus for L.L.M. program (2001-2002), Faculty of
Law, University of Leiden (1999).
26 Council Regulation 17/62 on the First Regulation Implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (P013) 204-11.
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empt the transport sector from the application of Regulation
No. 17/62.
According to Article 1 of Council Regulation 141/62,27 the
exemption for implementing Articles 81 and 82 only applies to
air transport service itself, to the services directly connected with
the operation of air transport service, or the services directly
connected with the operation of air transport service and per-
formed by the airlines themselves.28
Due to the development of EC integration, the application of
EC competition law in air transportation has been changed by a
series of regulations and case law. Examples include Council
Regulation 3975/87, as amended by Council Regulations 1284/
91 and 2410/92, and Council Regulation 3976/87, as amended
by Council Regulations 2344/90 and 2411/92. Regulation
3975/87 officially applies Articles 82 and 83 to the air transport
sector, while Regulation 3976/87 grants the Commission the
power to adopt block exemptions for certain categories of ar-
rangements. 2 9 Other regulations concerning the competition is-
sues in the air transport sector also exist.3
2. Council Regulation No. 4064/89
Articles 81 and 82 set out basic principles of EC competition
law. Together with other regulations, which are not sufficient to
cover all operations that might be incompatible with the system
of undistorted competition envisioned in the EC Treaty, Coun-
cil Regulation 4064/89 (ECMR) was adopted on December 21,
1989, and entered into force on September 21, 1990.
27 Article I of Council Regulation 141/62 reads: "Regulation 17 shall not apply
to agreements, decisions or concerted practices in the transport sector which
have as their object or effect the fixing of transport rates and conditions, the
limitation or control of the supply of transport or the sharing of transport mar-
kets; nor shall it apply to the abuse of a dominant position, within the meaning of
Article 86 of the Treaty, within transport market." Council Regulation 141/62 on
Exempting Transport from the Application of Council Regulation No. 17, 1962
0.J. (124) 2751, art. 1.
28 SeeJOHN BAFOUR, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AIR LAW 187-90 (1995).
2 See Council Regulation 3975/87 on Laying Down the Procedure for the Ap-
plication of the Rules on Competition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sec-
tor, 1987 0.J. (L374) 1-8, art. 1; Council Regulation 2410/92 on Amending
Regulations 3975/87, 1992 O.J. (L240) 18, art. 1.
3o See also Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 0J. (L155) 18-22; Commis-
sion Regulation 84/91, 1991 0J. (L010) 14; Commission Regulation 83/91, 1991
0.J. (L010) 9; Commission Regulation 82/91, 1991 0J. (L010) 7.
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ECMR stated that a concentration shall be deemed to arise
where:
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or
(b) one or more persons already controlling at least one under-
taking, or one or more undertakings acquire, whether by
purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other
means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or
more other undertakings. 31
The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all
the functions of an autonomous economic entity ... shall consti-
tute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph (b).32
The word "control" is comprehensive in the ECMR. Control
can constitute rights, contracts, or any other means that, either
separately or in combination with the considerations of fact or
law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influ-
ence on an undertaking, in particular by: "(a) ownership or the
right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; (b) rights
or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composi-
tion, voting or decision of the organs of an undertaking." 33
Furthermore, control is acquired by person or undertakings
that: "(a) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the
contracts concerned, or (b) while not being holders of such
rights or entitled to rights under such contracts, have the power
to exercise the right deriving therefrom."3 4
It is evident that friendly takeovers through mergers and ac-
quisitions are subject to the ECMR if they fall within the scope
of all concentrations having a community dimension3 5 as de-
fined by the ECMR. However, according to the ECMR, under
certain conditions, a concentration that has no community di-
mension that creates or strengthens a dominant position, and
that impedes competition within the territory of one or more
States, would be treated as the type of concentration defined by
the ECMR. 6
The ECMR defines the scope of a concentration with a com-
munity dimension.3" This scope will be discussed in subsection
31 Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Un-
dertakings, 1989 O.J. (L395) 1-12, art. 3.
32 Id. at art. 3(2).
33 Id. at art. 3(3)(a), (b).
34 Id. at art. 3(4)(a), (b).
35 Id. at art. 1.
36 Id. at art. 2.2(2).
37 Id. at art. 1.
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four of this section with the Boeing / McDonnell Douglas take-
over.38 The ECMR also provides for the powers of the Commis-
sion, formalities and procedures of investigation, as well as prior
notification of concentration.
3. Takeovers Under U.S. Antitrust Law
Like in the European Community, antitrust law in the United
States is aimed at promoting free competition in the market
place. Under U.S. antitrust law, any agreement, co-operative ef-
fort, or intent by two or more entities that affects or restrains, or
is likely to affect or restrain their competitors, is illegal. 39 Mo-
nopolies or an abusive use of a dominant position in the market
is also illegal.40
The legal framework of U.S. antitrust laws is based on the
Sherman Act 41 and the Clayton Act. 42 Takeovers such as merg-
ers and acquisitions come within the Sherman Act, as would any
other business transaction, but the Clayton Act is the principle
law governing mergers and acquisitions. The philosophy dictat-
ing the legality of mergers and acquisitions is that competition is
more intense when there are more competitors in a given mar-
ket. In turn, the market size as well as the relative size of the
competitors, become factors.
In U.S. antitrust law, the prohibition against monopolies is
also divided into horizontal 43 and vertical restraints.44 The 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines45 ("1992 Guidelines") won a
greater role in U.S. competition law than its counterpart in the
EU. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued by the Justice
8 See infra part. III(A) (4).
39 See ALFRED F. CROTrI, TRADING UNDER EEC AND US ANTITRUST LAws 7
(1977). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
40 See supra note 39.
41 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15'U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1994)).
42 Clayton Act, ch. 322, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1994)).
43 Horizontal restraints include price agreements, agreements that result in
price alignment or limit sales, territorial division agreements, horizontal boycotts,
and tying.
44 Vertical restraints include resale price maintenance agreements, territorial
restriction agreements, and exclusive dealing agreements. Although some of the
cases are no longer per se prohibited, it is obvious they will still be prohibited
under the rule of reason.
45 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992) (to be
codified at 57 C.F.R. pt. 41552-01).
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Department and Federal Trade Commission in 1992, replaced
older Guidelines issued in 1968, 1982, and 1984.
The 1992 Guidelines apply only to horizontal mergers, leaving
vertical and potential competition mergers to be covered under
the Guidelines issued in 1984. The 1992 Guidelines contain a
detailed description of how the government agencies define rel-
evant markets in horizontal merger cases. The Guidelines
generally reflect more economic sophistication in market defini-
tion46 than has been shown by the courts.
Subsequently, the antitrust laws in the U.S. and in the EU are
aimed at promoting free competition in the market place. They
may be paraphrased collectively as declarations of principle that
any agreement, co-operative effort, or intent by two or more en-
tities that affects, restrains, or is likely to affect or restrain their
competitors, is illegal.
The airline industry in the United States used to be highly
regulated by the now defunct Civil Aeronautical Board (CAB),
and the Department of Transportation (DOT). After the pro-
mulgation of the Deregulation Act of 1978, the takeovers (in-
cluding mergers and acquisitions) among U.S. airlines were
stimulated by the market change and were primarily reviewed by
the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division ("Antitrust Di-
vision"). The Antitrust Division analyzes the takeovers among
U.S. airlines and between U.S. airlines and foreign airlines using
the same standards as those applied to other industries.
4. The Boeing / McDonnell Douglas Takeover Case
On December 15, 1996, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas an-
nounced their intention to merge. Boeing's $13 billion take-
over bid for McDonnell Douglas was the most dramatic step in
the consolidation of the U.S. military industry, as well as in the
airliner manufacturing industry.47 The European Union gave its
formal permission to Boeing's $15 billion takeover in July
46 The 1992 Guidelines establish relatively clear standards for assessing the
anti-competitive consequences of mergers with the introduction of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the market concentration. See
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 219 (3d. ed. 1999).
47 William D. Hartung, Military Monopoly, World Policy Institute (Jan. 13,
1997), available al http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/monopoly.
htm.
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1997.48 The goal was to create an American aviation giant,
strong enough to compete with Airbus in the commercial avia-
tion market. 9
The Boeing / McDonnell Douglas case involved a number of
competition issues. Lessons from the Boeing / McDonnell
Douglas case include the relative merits of competition law and
trade agreements to solve cross-border competition problems.50
For Boeing, the benefits of cooperation include expanding their
limits to an international level. The European Union and the
U.S. discussed the case in detail and understood each other's
positions very well. As a result, conflict was ultimately avoided.
However, if the European Union prohibits a merger that the
U.S. does not challenge, no World Trade Organization dispute
settlement could be decided about whether the merger could
proceed.
The civil aircraft construction industry is a highly concen-
trated sector, with only three companies sharing the market.
Consequently, any contract signed by a competitor could di-
rectly influence the other parties' market shares or benefits. In
order to have a successful takeover, Boeing had to give up its
exclusivity contracts with European clients, surrendering some
of its benefits. If Boeing merged without making any conces-
sions, it would face the threat of commercial retaliation. This
kind of practice in takeovers could greatly affect multinational
corporations' future mergers and acquisitions.
The European Commission has become an important player
in all mergers, even those involving non-European firms. Its le-
gal competence is based on European Competition. Because
the concerned corporations have sizeable market shares in Eu-
rope, the European Commission's involvement is essential. Al-
though the Commission has no jurisdiction for operations that
do not take place in Europe, it does, nevertheless, have consid-
erable powers. The legal basis for the European Commission's
intervention is EC Council Regulation No. 4064/89.5 ' Follow-
ing Article 1(2) of this Regulation, a concentration is consid-
48 European Business News, EU Gives Formal Clearance to Boeing, McDonnell Doug-
las Merger (July 30, 1997), available at http://www.hri.org/news/europe/ebn/97-
07-30.ebn.html.
49 Id.
50 Jonathan Faull, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 22-
23, 1998).
51 Council Regulation 4064/89, supra note 11.
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ered to be of European dimension when the two following
conditions are met:
(1) the total world turnover of all concept firms represents an
amount greater than 5 billion Euro or the European individ-
ual turnover of at least two of the firms concerned represents
an amount greater than 250 million Euro, unless every firm
concerned realizes 2/3 of its turnover in a single Member
State; or
(2) the combined aggregate world-wide turnover of all the un-
dertakings concerned is more than 2.5 billion Euro or the
combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings con-
cerned is more than 100 million Euro or in each of at least
three Member States included, the aggregate turnover of
each at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than
25 million Euro and the aggregate Community-wide turno-
ver of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more
than 100 million Euro. 52
The thresholds provided for in this Regulation are main-
tained, but the application areas are broadened after the pro-
mulgation of Regulation No. 1310/97, which stresses the
secondary nature taken by national concentration controls. The
results clearly show that investors took a lot of time to judge how
credible the intervention of the European Commission is in a
case concerning U.S. firms, which also led to the signing of an
anti-trust agreement between the European Union and the
United States.53 This agreement allows the competition authori-
ties on each side to ask each other to investigate anti-competitive
business practices by companies based in their counterpart's ter-
ritory in an effort to improve enforcement action.54
The different approaches taken by U.S. and EU enforcement
authorities on the lawfulness of the Boeing / McDonnell Doug-
las merger raises the prospect of increasing conflict among the
world's antitrust authorities. Both the U.S. and the EU claim
the right to evaluate transactions that produce economic effects
within their borders, but which occur abroad. Traditional
means of avoiding conflict through doctrines of comity or other
balancing processes seem unpromising. This case became a
milestone for governments and scholars to make new proposals
52 Id. at art. 1(2).
53 P. JACQUEMIN, ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETrING:
THE WAY AHEAD 1179-83 (1998).
54 Id.
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for minimizing conflict in the antitrust evaluation of transac-
tions involving significant multimarket effects.
The most important differences in competition law among ju-
risdictions are primarily traceable in the amount and design of
the distributional concerns they incorporate. Therefore, some
propose, as a means of lessening international conflict over
competition policies, that when ajurisdiction asserts the author-
ity to evaluate a transaction involving significant multimarket ef-
fects, the acting jurisdiction bases its evaluation on the common
element in all antitrust laws: efficiency.55
B. CHINA'S COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
China promulgated its Competition Law in 1993: the Law of
the People's Republic of China Against Unfair Competition
("Competition Law of 1993") .5 The contents of the Competi-
tion Law of 1993 include general provisions, acts of unfair com-
petition, supervision and inspection, legal responsibility, and
supplementary provisions.
Acts of "unfair competition" are defined as follows:
1) counterfeiting or using without authorization of a registered
trademark, name, package, decoration of another person,
e tc;
57
2) governmental agencies restricting people to purchasing
commodities from the business operators designated by
them, thereby precluding other business operators from fair
competition; 51
3) abusing administrative powers to restrict commodities,
originating in other places, from entering the local markets
or the local commodities from flowing into markets of other
places;59
4) offering money or goods or by any other means, in selling or
purchasing commodities;'
55 Daniel J. Gieford & E. Thomas Sullivan, Can International Antitrust be Saved
for the Post-Boeing Merger World?, 45 Antitrust Bulletin 55 (2000).
56 Law of the People's Republic of China Against Unfair Competition (Sept. 2,
1993), available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=274.
57 Id. at art. 5, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
53 Id. at art. 6, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
519 Id. at art. 7, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
6o Id. at art. 8, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
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5) advertisements or any other means that make false or mis-
leading publicity of his commodities as to their quality, in-
gredients, functions, usage, producers, duration of validity,
or origin;"
7) infringing upon trade secrets; 2
8) selling the commodities at prices lower than costs, selling
perishables or live commodities, disposing of commodities
near expiration of their validity duration or those kept too
long in stock, seasonal sales; or selling commodities at a re-
duced price for the purpose of clearing off debts, change of
business or suspension of operation; 63
9) conducting tie-in sales of commodities or attach any other
unreasonable conditions to the sale of their commodities;64
10) lottery-attached sale.'3
Apparently, there are no provisions in this law addressing a
number of concerns. These unaddressed concerns include: re-
striction of potential anti-competitive results of a takeover (a
merger or acquisition) of a business or company; the restriction
of the market share percentage by which a takeover can prevent,
restrict, or distort competition in the market; or the abuse of the
dominant position in the market. Furthermore, there are no
provisions in the Competition Law of 1993 about the notifica-
tion systems or authorities in charge of competition affairs.
To the contrary, it seems that the Competition Law of 1993
focuses on more commercial transactions rather than on the
possible abuse of market position. As China is moving towards a
market-oriented economy, more attention is paid to the open-
ness of the traditionally closed markets throughout China. The
Regulations of the State Council Concerning Prohibiting the
Implementation of Regional Barriers in the Course of Market
Economy Activities were promulgated, and came into force, on
April 21, 2001 ("Regulations of 2001"). 6 6
61 Id. at art. 9, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
62 Id. at art. 10, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
63 Id. at art. 11, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
64 Id. at art. 12, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
65 Id. at art. 13, available at http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=
274.
66 See Regulations of the State Council Concerning Prohibiting the Implemen-
tation of Regional Barriers in the Course of Market Economy Activities (Apr. 21,
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Under these regulations, units67 and individuals are prohib-
ited from obstructing or interfering with entry into the local
market of non-local products or "construction project-type ser-
vices. " " The prohibition extends to any manner that violates
laws, administrative regulations or State Council regulations, or
deceives or covers up acts of obstructing or interfering with en-
try into the local market of such products and services, thereby
restricting unfair competition. '9
The Regulations of 2001 list a number of specific "regional
barrier" acts that local people's governments and their depart-
ments are prohibited from committing.7 ° They also provide that
no local authorities may enact or implement regional barrier
regulations or regulations containing regional barrier
elements.71
A large part of the Regulations of 2001 contains rules that
government departments will be responsible for such as cor-
recting various types of protectionist conduct that branches of
the Government will be responsible for modifying or repealing.
Again, the Regulations do not address takeovers of local corpo-
rations. It is difficult to find similarities between competition
law in China and the law in the EU or in the U.S.
China is quickly moving from a State-owned economy to a
market oriented economy. Industries in China are being der-
egulated, broken up, and reorganized geographically according
to value chains. There are foreign investments flowing in and
out of China. All of these potential investments need competi-
tion and antitrust considerations. While there are more take-
overs occurring in China, the need for legislation on preventing
restrictions (dominant market position) or distortions to com-
petition is becoming important.
2001), available at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2001-04-30/26/89168.html
(Chinese version) [hereinafter Regulations of 2001].
67 "Unit" is a comprehensive word in Chinese. It may refer to a governmental
agency or a commercial entity.
68 See Regulations of 2001, supra note 66.
69 Id. at art. 3.
70 Id.
71 1d. at art. 5.
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IV. TAKEOVERS UNDER CHINA'S COMPANY LAW AND
SECURITIES LAW
A. TAKEOVERS UNDER CHINA'S COMPANY LAW
As a consequence of the need to retain State control and the
lack of legal provisions, takeovers in certain industrial sectors in
China were limited. There are, however, specific regulations
that specify the level of shareholdings of certain industries that
must be retained by the State or through State-owned enter-
prises or legal persons.72 The State has been particularly con-
scious of keeping interests balanced among citizens and
protecting the interests of those connected with smaller Chinese
enterprises that may be absorbed by larger, wealthier overseas
corporations.
However, takeovers among privately owned or collectively
owned companies now occur in China. Furthermore, the form-
ing of mega companies is encouraged in China to face the chal-
lenges, such as more foreign counterparts entering in China,
making the competition tougher since China became a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.
Under the Company Law of the People's Republic of China
("Company Law of China"),7 companies are classified as joint
stock limited companies, limited liability companies, and wholly
State-owned companies.7 1 In reality, there are many State-
owned companies that are partly privatized as joint stock limited
companies or that are changed into limited liability companies.
In addition, there are other companies with foreign investments
such as Sino-foreign companies that are governed by other spe-
cial laws of China. These are all considered as foreign-invested
companies.75
There are some provisions in China's Company Law concern-
ing takeovers (mergers) .76 For a merger or division of a com-
pany to take place, a resolution must be passed in a
72 For example, in the case of investment in public aviation transport enter-
prises, any single foreign investor may only hold no more than a 25 percent
share. The Chinese party in foreign-invested civil airports shall hold the biggest
share among the investors.
73 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 29, 1993), available at
http: / /www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal/laws-regs/pdf/pdf-e/c9100371e.pdf
[hereinafter Company Law of China].
74 Id. at chs. 1-3.
75 Zhang Xin, Regulating Chinese M&A (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://
www.financeasia.com/Articles/7C3525FB-B30A- 11 D6-81E50090277E 174B.cfm.
76 Company Law of China, supra note 73.
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shareholders' meeting.7 7 In addition, the State-authorized de-
partment or other authorities must approve any merger or divi-
sion of a joint stock company.78 A company may use a takeover
or create a new entity to achieve a merger. Indeed, the Com-
pany Law describes the process of mergers and acquisitions, dif-
ferentiating between the dissolution of one entity by way of a
takeover, and the dissolution of two separate entities by way of a
merger. The key to the merger or division of a State-owned
company is the application package and the required approvals.
In practice, companies seeking to rely on the above men-
tioned provisions need to hold substantial discussions with rele-
vant governmental departments for a considerable period of
time prior to convening a shareholders' meeting. Moreover, the
support of the shareholders in terms of the relevant Ministry or
department, which acts as the promoter of the enterprise, is fun-
damental to takeovers.
Chinese Company Law also provides that when undertaking a
merger, parties must sign an agreement and a balance sheet,
and list the assets of the company. These actions must occur not
less than ten days prior to the passing of the resolution on the
company merger.79
The company must notify the creditors of the merger by a
public announcement in the relevant newspapers at least three
times within thirty days. Creditors have thirty days from the re-
ceipt of the notice or ninety days from the first announcement
of the takeover, if the creditors did not receive any notice, to
request the company to settle its debts or to provide the credi-
tors with a guarantee of repayment.8 0 If the company fails to do
so, the merger will not proceed. The provisions also require the
acquiring company or the company established as the result of
the merger to assume all debts receivable and payable of the
merging parties.8 " These are relatively standard provisions in-
tended to protect creditors. However, parties to such transac-
tions should be conscious of the need to follow the procedure
correctly. Any approval of the ultimate merger may depend
upon the proper discharge of these obligations.
77 Id. at art. 182.
78 Id. at art. 183.




According to Article 188 of the Company Law of China, where
the merger or division of a company involves changes in regis-
tered items, such changes must be registered with the Company
Registration Authority.82 Where a company is dissolved, the
company must apply for cancellation of its registration in accor-
dance with the law: (1) where a new company is incorporated;
(2) where the registration of the incorporation of the company
shall be carried out according to law; and (3) where a company
increases or reduces its registered capital, it shall apply to the
Company Registration Authority for registration of the changes
in accordance with the law.83
If a company being merged or divided reduces its registered
capital or carries out liquidation, and fails to notify its creditors
or fails to announce the same to its creditors, the company must
rectify the situation and will be fined. 4
In addition to the Company Law of China, which contains
provisions on mergers and divisions of companies in China, on
September 23, 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Eco-
nomic Co-operation (MOFTEC) and the State Administration
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) jointly promulgated the Pro-
visions of MOFTEC and SAIC on Merger and Division of For-
eign Invested Enterprises ("Merger Provisions of 1999"1).85 The
Merger Provisions of 1999 took effect on November 1, 1999.86
The Merger Provisions of 1999 attempt to address deficiencies
in corporate merger and division rules under the Company Law
of China and to add clarity to the procedures that must be fol-
lowed in a merger or division of Foreign Invested Enterprises
(FIEs).
If any entity violates the statutory procedures to takeover com-
panies to seek improper earnings, the offender must rectify the
matter, the illegal income will be confiscated, and a fine will be
imposed. 7
B. TAKovERS UNDER CHINA'S SECURITIES LAW
In China's legislation governing takeovers of public listing
companies, the Securities Law of the People's Republic of China
82 Id. at art. 188.
83 Id.
84 Id. at art. 228.
85 Merger and Divisions of Foreign Invested Enterprises Provisions (Nov.
1999), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/lawml.asp.
86 Id.
87 Company Law of China, supra note 73, at art. 217.
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("Securities Law") are the most important rules.8 There are
many provisions in the Securities Law, including takeover an-
nouncement, information disclosure, and security companies.
The law is deemed a milestone in the development of Chinese
securities and it varies in many aspects to the previously promul-
gated legislation. Chapter IV of the Securities Law, entitled
Takeover of Listed Companies, includes Articles 78 to 94.89
Article 78 of the Securities Law provides that a listed company
may be taken over by offer or by agreement.90 Here, the words
"offer" might include hostile takeovers while the word "agree-
ment" means friendly takeovers. Article 89 provides for the case
of a takeover agreement with shareholders of the company
under takeover, as prescribed in the laws and administrative reg-
ulations." The Securities Law also requires that the transfer of
shares must be done via a securities registration and clearing
institution with a deposit of the funds in a designated bank.92
The Securities Law further prescribes that a person who ac-
quires the shares of a company through a takeover offer or take-
over agreement and closes down the company taken over, is
deemed to have merged. 3 The purchaser must have the ex-
isting shares of the closed-down company replaced according to
law. 4 Apparently, under the current Securities Law, there are
two kinds of takeovers of listed companies in China: mergers
and acquisitions.
In China, laws normally provide principles as guidelines for
certain issues, and administrative regulations or ministerial reg-
ulations are issued as complementary provisions. On September
28, 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
issued its Regulating Methods on Takeovers of Listed Compa-
nies ("Methods on Takeovers of Listed Companies") ,'9 5 which
also allowed takeovers of a listed company by means of adminis-
1 Securities Law of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 29, 1998), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/elaws.htm [hereinafter Securities Law].
89 Corporate Law and Securities Law Legislations of China, available at http://
www.law-bridge.net/english/e-colaws.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
9 Securities Law, supra note 88, at art. 78.
91 Id. at art. 89.
92 Id. at art. 90.
93 Id. at art. 92.
94 Id.





trative transfer,96 court decision, inheritance, and endorse-
ment.97 Methods on Takeovers of Listed Companies further
provides for the formalities and legal liabilities of fake reports of
assessment of assets, audit reports, legal opinions, and financial
advice.98
V. UNITED STATES AIRLINE DEREGULATION
AND TAKEOVERS
A. BACKGROUND
Before 1978, the United States airline industry was highly reg-
ulated on the sheer belief of protecting the public interest.9
From 1938 to 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) provided
cradle-to-grave economic regulation of the U.S. airline industry,
literally.10° For example, an airline could not go into business
or out of business, or anything in between, without the permis-
sion of a majority of the five presidential appointed CAB mem-
bers."" At that time, the industry resembled a public utility,
with a government agency, CAB, determining the routes each
airline flew and overseeing the prices they charged.
There are some key factors that led to the deregulation of the
United States airline industry. One of these developments was
the advent of the wide body aircraft, which increased airline ca-
pacity dramatically. Another factor was the Middle Eastern oil
embargo in 1973, which caused oil costs to skyrocket and led to
price inflation. In addition, an economic downturn at that time
put severe strains on the airline industry. In line with its man-
date to ensure a reasonable rate of return for the airline indus-
try, CAB responded to this crisis by allowing carriers to increase
fares, embarked on a four-year moratorium to authorize new
services, and approved a series of agreements among the airlines
Administrative Transfer (xing zheng hua bo or xing zheng hua zhuan) is a
special phrase in Chinese law when two State-owned enterprises are merged or
one enterprise is taken over by another, the government agency decides. The
assets of one enterprise shall be transferred to another enterprise without pay-
ment because both of them belong to the State. This situation normally happens
within the same industry. As for the takeovers occurring in different industries,
payments will happen.
97 Methods on Takeover of Listed Companies, supra note 95, at art. 22.
98 See Methods on Takeover of Listed Companies, supra note 95.
'9 Frank J. Costello, The Lessons of Airline Deregulation Infrastrcture, ABA News-
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to limit capacity on major routes. 102 However, these measures
failed to improve the situation.
Concerned that government regulations had caused high
fares in many heavily traveled markets and inhibited the airline
industry's growth, the U.S. Congress deregulated the American
airline industry.103 The driving force behind deregulation was
the perception that regulation by the CAB had resulted in re-
duced competition and higher fares. 10 4
B. DEREGULATED AND NON-DEREGULATED ASPECTS
The U.S. Congress took the first legislative step toward airline
economic deregulation in November 1977. It gave American
cargo carriers the freedom to operate on any domestic route
and to charge whatever the market would bear. 105 Congress also
declared that one year following enactment of the bill, the CAB
could certify new domestic cargo carriers as long as they were
found fit, willing, and able. 10" Deregulation gave express carri-
ers the operating freedom high-quality services demanded, and
the result was outstanding growth for that segment of the avia-
tion industry over the next decade.
The Deregulation Act of 1978 applied free market competi-
tion to the transportation of passengers. 10 7 Restrictions on do-
mestic routes and schedules were eliminated, as well as
government controls over domestic rates. The CAB was disman-
tled on January 1, 1985.
International air transportation is regulated extensively by bi-
lateral agreements between governments exchanging commer-
cial rights for air services and agreeing on ways to regulate
capacity, tariffs, and other matters.0 8 Bilateral negotiations in-
volving the United States were led by the State Department, with
active Department of Transportation (DOT) policy input and
participation. The DOT also has the authority to approve and
immunize agreements affecting international air transportation,
102 Id.
103 Benjamin E. Sayles, Airline Deregulation and Its Effects (Dec. 9, 1999), available
at http://shakti.trincoll.edu/-bsayes/micro.html.
104 Costello, supra note 99.
105 Air Transportation Association, Airline Handbook Chapter 2: Deregulation,
available at www.air-transport.org/public/publications (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
106 Id.
107 Several of the CAB's functions were shifted to other government agencies,
primarily to the Department of Transportation.
108 H.WASSENBURGH, BILATERAL REGULATION 148 (1999).
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as well as the responsibility to maintain air services in small com-
munities by establishing the Essential Air Service program.1 0°
This program provides subsidies to carriers willing to serve do-
mestic locations that would be economically infeasible to serve.
Last but not least, the Airline Deregulation Act ended the Gov-
ernment's economic regulation of airline routes and rates, but
not airline safety regulation.
C. EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION AND THE PRESENT SITUATION
There are many effects and possible effects of deregulation,
such as the widespread development of hub-and-spoke net-
works, easy access to the market by new entrants, increased com-
petition caused by new entrants, rapid expansion into new
markets by many of the established carriers, discount fares re-
sulting from competition, and growth of air travel.
Nevertheless, because of the competition and some ruthless
price wars unleashed by deregulation, in the past two decades,
bankruptcy and mergers have become far more common, even
among mega-carriers. In the past two decades, Braniff, Eastern,
and Pan American have gone bankrupt, while Continental,
America West, and TWA all filed for bankruptcy protection.1
The fact is that deregulation might not be a panacea.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Congress
passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act, which entered into force on September 22, 2001.1' The
U.S. Government provided $5 billion in direct payments to car-
riers to assist them in recovering from financial losses sustained
as a result of the attacks. The U.S. DOT moved quickly to dis-
tribute nearly half of this amount to 111 carriers,1 2 and contin-
ues to distribute the remaining funds. In addition, the U.S.
Government has also provided billions of dollars in loan guaran-
tees to U.S. air carriers. 1 3
109 See House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture, Subcommittee on Aviation, The Future of the Small Community Essential
Air Service Program (May 25, 2000), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/Trans/hpw106-94.000/hpw 106-94 1.HTM.
110 Walter Goraalski, Deregulation Dj4d Vu (June 17, 1996), available at http://
telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom-deregulation-dejayvu.
"I Department of Transportation Procedures for Remaining Carrier Payments
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The deregulation of the airline industry in the U.S. meant
that the airlines controlled decision making with regard to ser-
vice entry and exit, pricing, bankruptcy, and, to a lesser extent,
takeovers." 4 Today, the U.S. Government, through financing,
helps U.S. air carriers to survive, which clearly demonstrates that
the Government will not truly deregulate the airline industry
when the industry is in trouble and when deregulation may neg-
atively affect the American economy. Essentially, the U.S. Gov-
ernment does not need to take the initiative to mandate
takeovers among the U.S. airlines because the market condi-
tions in the U.S. are mature and more competitive than those in
China.
VI. TAKEOVERS AMONG THE CHINESE AIRLINES
A. BACKGROUND
In a discussion of the Chinese airline industry, a brief history
must be mentioned. In 1949, the General Administration of
Civil Aviation of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of
China (formerly the CAAC) was formed by the Chinese Govern-
ment in order to oversee and operate all aspects of civil aviation
in China." 5 The work of the former CAAC included managing
China's air transportation and airports. Additionally, the for-
mer CAAC was a part of the Air Force of the Chinese army. The
former CAAC acted as a government agency and a commercial
entity. Today, the CAAC' 6 is used only for the General Admin-
istration of Civil Aviation of China, which falls under the State
Council of China.
On July 17, 1952, the People's Airline was founded in Tian
Jin, China, which was the first State-owned enterprise set up in
China. This airline, however, was terminated and merged into
the CAAC inJune 1953V17 For many years, the CAAC was vested
with the combined functions of a regulatory authority and a
commercial entity. In the latter role, it was involved in the oper-
114 Sayles, supra note 103.
115 A Few Words About CAAC, Annual Report 1998, available at http://
wii.caac.gov.cn/gznb/89-5.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
116 According to Article 2 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of
China, the CAAC is authorized to exercise unified supervision and administra-
tion over civil aviation activities in the whole country. The CAAC also authorizes,
issues, regulations and decisions concerning civil aviation activities within the
scope of its authority.
117 A Few Words About CAAC, Annual Report 1998, available at http://
nvw.caac.gov.cn/gznb/89-5.lhtm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
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ation of airlines. The CAAC underwent a great change through
a process of decentralization. The CAAC was separated from
the commercial section, which turned out to be some major air-
lines, with a certain degree of autonomy over their commercial
operations in the 1980s." 8
Gradually, the CAAC's commercial section of air transporta-
tion of passengers, baggage, and cargo was divided into nine ma-
jor airlines."' Each of these was authorized or designated to fly
domestic, Hong Kong regional routes, and some international
routes. Currently, the routes of these airlines primarily origi-
nate from their home airport or other airports within their re-
spective geographic coverage areas. Each airline is incorporated
with its own business license, managed independently, and is re-
sponsible for its own operations, profits, and losses.
On pace with the economic reform and development in
China during the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, some other air-
lines, either through shares or the financial support of the local
government, were established from scratch. These include
Shanghai Airlines and Shenzhen Airlines, mainly to fly domestic
routes.
The Chinese airline industry has been rapidly growing for the
past twenty years. In 1980, there were only 191 commercial
flight routes in China, of which, 159 were domestic routes, four
regional, -12 0 and the rest were international routes. In 2000,
there were 1,165 flight routes, of which, 133 were international
routes, and the rest were domestic routes.1 21 In the same year,
Chinese civil aviation air transport traffic totalled 12.25 billion
tonne-kilometre.1 22 In the past decade, passengers and cargo
traffic carried increased by an annual average rate of 16% and
118 Id.
119 There were ten major airlines, but the following are the current nine major
airlines: Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines, China
Northern Airlines, China Northwest Airlines, China Southwest Airlines, XinJiang
Airlines, Yunnan Airlines, and China Airlines (HK). The original China General
Airlines merged with China Eastern Airlines in 1998. Now another wave of re-
structuring is under way within the Chinese airline industry.
120 At that time, the routes to Hong Kong and Macao were called regional
routes, which were actually treated as international routes from the commercial
point of view.
121 See Statistical Data on Civil Aviation of China as published by General Ad-
ministration of Civil Aviation of China (2001).
122 Id.
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total traffic by more than 18%, both exceeding China's gross
domestic product growth from between six and eight percent. 23
TABLE-i
2000 STATISTICS OF TRAFFIC VOLUME PERFORMED
BY THE WHOLE INDUSTRY
Unit:'0000 tonne-kn
Increased(%) v.
Traffic performed 2000 previous year
Total Traffic perforned 1225007.42 15.5
Domestic routes 759817.19 13.9
Including inland to HK& Macao regional 56879.19 11.0
routes
International routes 465189.83 17.9
Source: CAAC Annual Report.
B. INDUSTRY ISSUES
Today, there are about 28 airlines in China servicing the air
transportation of passengers, baggage, cargo, and mail. Among
them, nine major airlines are directly controlled by the CAAC,
which accounts for 80% of the market share of the traffic vol-
ume. However, economic problems have frustrated the airline
industry in recent years. Quickly increasing capacity, rising fuel
prices and steep fare discounts have driven most of China's air-
lines into the red.
One perspective is that the CAAC's tight control of manage-
ment appointment, employee welfare and purchasing rendered
airline companies unable to adjust their flights and fares in light
of market demand. This inability to change has led to poor per-
formance throughout most of the industry.1 2'4 The aim of the
takeovers among Chinese airlines is to solve the deep-rooted
problems such as scattered transportation capability, small scale
of air transportation enterprises, high rate of liabilities, and slow
pace of modern enterprise establishments.1 25
123 China Southern Airlines Positioned for Growth, 10 INT'L AIRPORT REPORT 2
(2002).
124 CAAC, The Takeoff With Heavy Burden (Mar. 7, 2002), available at
www.chinameetwest.com (Chinese version).




C. THE SCHEME OF RESTRUCTURE (TAKEoVERs)
In order to raise the efficiency and competitiveness of the air-
line industry, China has decided to restructure its State-owned
airline industry by mergers. On October 11, 2002, a State-or-
dered consolidation of the Chinese airline industry was an-
nounced. Three new holding companies were established to
take over nine airlines directly under the control of the CAAC:
1) China National Aviation Holding Company ("CNAirHold-
ing," based on existing Air China);
2) China Southern Air Holding Company ("CSAirHolding,"
based on present Southern Air Group Company); and
3) China Eastern Air Holding Company ("CEAHolding,"
based on Eastern Air Group Company). 26
These three holding companies and their senior management
staff were to be established and appointed on the same day. For
the sake of convenience throughout this article, these three
holding companies are referred to together as the "Three Hold-
ing Companies."
In fact, the original flag-carrier, Air China, will take over
China Southern Airlines and China National Aviation Corpora-
tion. The new holding company will be the China National Avi-
ation Holding Co., with assets of 57.3 billion yuan ($6.94
billion), a fleet of 119 aircraft, 307 routes, and 22,960 employ-
ees.' 27 Southern Air Group Company and its main subsidiary,
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. (the mainland's largest airline
and dozens of other subsidiaries), will merge with China North-
ern and Xingjiang Airlines. This merger will result in assets to-
taling 50.1 billion yuan ($6.06 billion), a fleet of 180 aircraft,
666 routes, and 34,268 employees. -'2 8 China Eastern Air Com-
pany with China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd., its biggest subsidiary,
and dozens of other subsidiaries will take over Yunnan Airlines
and China Northern Airlines. This will result in a total of 47.3
billion yuan ($5.73 billion) in assets, a fleet of 142 aircraft, 386
routes, and 25,000 employees. 29
126 Apart from the three major carriers, three other major aviation industry
groups were announced: China Travelsky Holding Co., China Aviation Oil Hold-
ing Co., and China Aviation Supplies Import and Export Group Company.
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According to the abstracts of the Scheme of Restructure is-
sued in the CAAC Journal,'3 ° the General Administration of
Civil Aviation of China cut its economic ties with those nine air-
lines. The top management staffs of the Three Holding Compa-
nies shall be appointed by the central Government, the assets
and financial relations shall be regulated by the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and the CAAC shall retreat to functioning only as an in-
dustry regulator.
It was said that the CAAC's duty would be transformed into
maintaining a fair market environment and protecting con-
sumer's fundamental interests.' l In other words, the CAAC will
not be responsible for managing the assets of those airlines after
the takeovers because the structure of the combined role of as-
sets-owner and industry regulator no longer suits China's fast
developing market economy.1 3 2
The Three Holding Companies are said to be legal entities
and market subjects, which operate independently and will en-
joy the operation benefits and will be responsible for losses.133
The Three Holding Companies will not bear any governmental
function.
Among the Three Holding Companies, CNAirHolding does
not have any public subsidiary listed, and CSAirHolding and
CEAHolding have two subsidiary airlines publicly listed at home
and abroad. According to the president of CSAirHolding, the
restructure (takeovers) will be completed in two steps. The first
step is the establishment of SCAirHolding Company, followed
by a transferring period where the original three airlines remain
legal persons, but shall gradually coordinate their operations
into one operation. The second step is to insert the assets of the
core business (air transport) of the two other airlines into those
of China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. 34 The main goal of the
takeovers is for CNAirHolding to transform its air transportation
section (Air China) into a joint stock limited company. The
other two companies, based on their overseas and domestic
listed companies, plan to inject the assets of air transportation of
the other airlines into the listed companies.
130 Abstracts of the Scheme of Restructure, CAACJ. (Oct. 11, 2002).
131 Guo Ai Bing, Airlines on Path to Consolidation, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2002).
132 Id.
133 Abstracts of the Scheme of Restructure, CAACJ., art. 1 (Oct. 11, 2002).
134 Xinhuanet, News Report by China News Agency (Oct. 12, 2002), available at
www.ch inanewsagency.com.
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TABLE-2
CNAIR HOLDING COMPANY
AND ITS PRESENT & FUTURE SUBSIDIARIES (AIRLINES)1 3 5
CN AIR HOLDING COMPANY
No Present Future
1 Air China (100% ownership) Air China (less 100%) if public listing
2 China National Aviation Co. The same
(100%) 136
3 China Southwest Airlines (100%)* Dissolved
4 Zhejiang Airlines (100%)* Dissolved
* The assents (including the fleet) and personnel relating air transportation shall be
transferred into Air China.
Source: Scheme of Restructure.
TABLE-3
CSAR HOLDING COMPANY
AND ITS PRESENT & FUTURE SUBSIDIARIES (AIRLINES)1
3 7
CS AIR HOLDING COMPANY
No Present Future
1 China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. Subject to equity change in the
(65.2%) 138 market and taking over the air
transport related assets from the
other two airlines.
2 China Northern Airlines* Dissolved
3 Xinjiang Airlines* Dissolved
* The assents (including the fleet) and personnel relating air transportation shall be
transferred into China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd.
Source: Scheme of Restnicture.
135 This table does not include other subsidiaries not directly connected with
air transportation.
136 Registered in Hong Kong, China National Aviation Co. is listed in Hong
Kong and owns 43% of Hong Kong's second largest airline, Hong Kong Dragon
Airline Ltd., known as Dragonair.
137 This table does not include other subsidiaries not directly connected with
air transportation.
138 Publicly listed in Hong Kong, New York and mainland, China.
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TABLE-4
CEA HOLDING COMPANY
AND ITS PRESENT & FUTURE SUBSIDIARIES (AIRLINES) 13 9
CS AIR HOLDING COMPANY
No Present Future
1 China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. Subject to equity change in the
(61.64%) 140 market and taking over the air
transport related assets from the
other two airlines.
2 China Northwest Airlines(100%)* Dissolved
3 Yunnan Airlines (100%)* Dissolved
* The assents (including the fleet) and personnel relating air transportation shall be
transferred into China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd.
Source: Scheme of Restructure
VII. LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING TAKEOVERS AMONG
CHINESE AIRLINES
The takeovers among the nine major airlines will involve legal
issues that should not be neglected. They cover, but are not
limited to, the legal status of the Three Holding Companies, the
market environment, ownership, agency, and the debts and
credits of the airlines. The following discussion will cover some
of these legal issues.
A. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THREE HOLDING COMPANIES
Under the Scheme of Restructure, the newly established
Three Holding Companies will act as wholly State-owned compa-
nies. According to the Company Law of the People's Republic
of China ("China Company Law"), a wholly State-owned com-
pany means a limited liability company invested in and estab-
lished solely by the State's authorized investment institution or a
department authorized by the State. 4 '
The CAAC used to be responsible for the value increase and
preservation of the assets of the State and those airlines directly
under it. After the establishment, the Three Holding Compa-
nies will be separated financially with the CAAC and will act as
airline enterprises, State authorized investment institutions, and
share holding companies.' 42
139 This table does not include other subsidiaries not directly connected with
air transportation.
140 Publicly listed in Hong Kong, New York and mainland, China.
141 Company Law of China, supra note 73, at art. 64.
142 Abstracts of the Scheme of Restructure, CAACJ. (Oct. 11, 2002).
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Under Chinese law, a wholly State-owned company shall not
establish a shareholders' meeting, but shall establish a board of
directors to exercise part of the functions and powers of a share-
holders' meeting and make decisions on important company
matters. 4 3 However, mergers, divisions, dissolutions, increases,
and reductions of capital, and the issuance of company bonds,
must be decided by the State's authorized investment institution
or the department authorized by the State. 44
Obviously, some contradictions exist between the functions of
the Three Holding Companies declared in the Scheme of
Restructure with China's Company Law. For example, as wholly
State-owned companies, the Three Holding Companies are for-
bidden to decide on the issues of merger, division, dissolution,
and increase and reduction of capital. 4 5 Instead, the State's au-
thorized investment institutions are entitled to decide on the
above-mentioned issues.
These problems may be solved by means of the articles of as-
sociation of the companies. These articles can be formulated by
the State's authorized investment institution, a department au-
thorized by the State, or by the board of directors for the ap-
proval of the relevant State authorized investment institution or
department. 146
Apparently, the Three Holding Companies shall have a dual
function, as limited liability companies, and as the trustees of
the State-owned assets. The method of selecting the board of
directors for the Three Holding Companies remains unclear, al-
though the general managers and deputy general managers
have already been appointed.
The takeovers among the nine Chinese airlines will be fin-
ished in two steps. First, the Three Holding Companies will take
over the existing Air China, Eastern Air Group Co. (including
China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd.), Southern Air Group Co. (in-
cluding China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd.) and the other six
airlines. Then the aircraft, relevant assets, and personnel of the
other six airlines shall be separated and injected into Air China,
China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd., and China Southern Airlines
Co., Ltd., respectively. This process will be complex and will re-
quire time to digest.
143 Company Law of China, supra note 73, at arts. 66, 68.
144 Id. at art. 66.
145 Id.
146 Id. at art. 65.
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B. THE MANAGING STAFF AND THEIR LEGAL STATUS
In China, theoretically speaking, all citizens in the country
own a wholly State-owned company. Today, the ownership and
management of most wholly State-owned companies are sepa-
rate. In the past, as the caretaker of the assets of State-owned
enterprises, the CAAC exercised a significant degree of control
in choosing the general managers or deputy general managers
of airlines. 47 The procedures of selection of these managers
are similar to those for choosing government officials, emphasiz-
ing the balance of powers and the movement of these managers
among the nine airlines. Under the provisions of the Scheme of
Restructure, the general mangers and deputy general managers
of the Three Holding Companies shall be appointed by the cen-
tral Government. It is unclear what kinds of standards shall be
applied in the future selection of those managers.
The problem with China's current managerial incentive sys-
tem in State-owned companies is that it either provides too little
personal incentive to managers, or it tends to give biased incen-
tives toward short-term accounting profits. Furthermore, the
management is delegated in part to government bureaucrats
and in part to enterprise managers.
However, the biggest problem might be the scope of the pow-
ers conferred to the general managers of the State-owned com-
panies because they are the legal representatives of the
companies. Under this kind of regime, the legal representatives
have far reaching powers. This kind of phenomenon is also
rooted in China's traditional culture advocating top decision
and the communist party's decision procedure, democracy and
concentration, where there is always a final decision maker. To
avoid abuse of the legal representatives' powers, the State Coun-
cil of China decided to appoint supervisory board members to
the major State-owned enterprises.
The Scheme of Restructure declared that the senior manage-
ment staff shall be appointed by the Government. It is interest-
ing to find that the general managers of the Three Holding
Companies are from the three airlines that are going to merge
with the other six airlines while deputy general managers in-
clude general managers from the airlines to be taken over.
This kind of arrangement is like a double-edged sword. On
one hand, there is a balance of power and the interests of the
147 The general managers or deputy general managers are equal to CEO's or
excessive vice-presidents in American corporations.
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employees can be heard in the highest decision making process.
On the other hand, certain demands, such as salaries, flight
routes, and arrangement of the fleet from different airlines in-
volved, might affect the time and process of the takeovers.
In recent years, China has been trying to establish a modern
enterprise regime, where the powers of a company shall be di-
vided into three groups-board of directors, managers, and su-
pervisory board. However, the majority of the board of directors
are normally also managers. Therefore, they have overwhelm-
ing power to do what they intend to do, especially the general
managers. On the other hand, the managers can easily be re-
moved from their positions because they are sometimes still con-
sidered governmental officials. Though the method of
delegating the powers of the State-owned enterprises needs to
be improved, China's Company Law has set up the basic princi-
ples for it. The question is how to implement the law properly
and how each holding company and its subsidiaries will establish
their enterprise culture.
C. DEBTS AND CREDITS OF THE AIRLINES TO BE TAKEN OVER
Too many airlines were trying to become global players in the
1990s. For example, Swiss Air moved into rapid expansion dur-
ing that period and took over a number of financially weak air-
lines, including buying a 49% stake in a Belgian carrier that was
later dragged into the debt abyss.
Among the Chinese airlines, one main question is how to
merge or reorganize their capital and workforce so that airlines'
needs are properly addressed. Unless adequately addressed, the
planned takeovers will further mask deep-seated structural
problems in a sector set by underperformance.148 To create effi-
ciency, the Chinese airline industry urgently needs to follow a
number of strategies such as adjustment of routes, cost control,
and proper allocation of human resources.
In a typical market economy, the use of bankruptcy, due to
poor performance, is one of the most important disciplinary
mechanisms for firms. In China, because of the fear of massive
unemployment and social instability, some airlines whose debts
148 The problem had been shown in China Southern Airlines' takeover of
Zhong Yuan Airlines, and Hai Nan Airlines' takeover of Chang An Airlines in
2000. See The Analysis of the Top 10 Takeovers in China 2000 (June 19, 2001),
available at http://comm.mergers-china.com/top10/index-3.asp (Chinese
version).
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exceed their assets might further burden the three major air-
lines that are making slim profits. Fortunately, the assets of the
airlines to be taken over will be divided into two parts, with air-
craft and relevant assets to be inserted into three major airlines.
The rest of the assets and liabilities will be absorbed by the hold-
ing companies.
Another concern to be addressed is that the takeovers are
against the will of managers whose airlines will be taken over.
Such takeovers (administrative maneuvering) may only transfer
the burden of liabilities and other problems to those well-per-
forming airlines, but not solve the fundamental underlying
problems such as the cultural recognition of the employees
from different airlines.
D. LEGAL STATUS OF THREE MAJOR AIRLINES
1. Air China
Air China, founded on July 1, 1998, is a wholly State-owned
enterprise. 49 It operates passenger and cargo services, special
and chartered flights, and general aviation. Air China has a
fleet of 64 aircraft. Air China now operates 114 routes, includ-
ing 43 international routes and 71 domestic routes, 150 and serves
39 cities in 28 countries and regions, and most of the provincial
capitals, major cities, and tourist attractions in China. It has two
branch offices in Tianjin and Innermongolia, 36 overseas repre-
sentative offices, and several domestic ones. 51 All of these
routes connect Beijing with various destinations both in China
and around the world, forming a well-established transport net-
work with Beijing as the center.
Over 15,000 people work for Air China, including more than
100 pilots and more than 1500 flight attendants. 5 2 The regis-
tered capital is 1.5 billion RMB (approx. $200 million), and the
total assets are 35.9 billion RMB (approx. $4.4 billion). 53
After the takeover is finished, Air China will have a fleet of
119 aircraft, and 307 routes. 54 Air China will probably benefit
by the takeover, reshape its flight network, and have more mar-
149 An Outline of Air China, available at http://www.airchina.com.cn (last vis-








ket shares throughout China, especially in the Beijing region
and in the Southwest part of China. It can be predicted that Air
China will be partly privatized and become a joint stock listed
company in the future.
2. China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd.
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. ("China Southern"), for-
merly a wholly State-owned company, was incorporated on
March 25, 1995 as a joint stock listed company. 155 Later, China
Southern succeeded in publicly listing the company in Hong
Kong and New York. As of mid-June 2002, China Southern op-
erated 323 routes-263 domestic, 39 international, and 21
Hong Kong routes. 156 China Southern operates a fleet of 109
aircraft. China Southern together with its subsidiaries is the
largest airline in the People's Republic of China.1 5 7
China Southern provides commercial airline services through-
out China, Hong Kong, and the Macao regions, as well as in
Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. China Southern
conducts a portion of its airline operations through Xiamen Air-
lines Company Limited, Southern Airlines Group, Shantou Air-
lines Limited, Guangxi Airlines Company Limited, Zhuhai
Airlines Company Limited, and Guizhou Airlines Company Lim-
ited ("the Airline Subsidiaries").1 58 Each of the Airline Subsidi-
aries is 60% owned by China Southern. 159  The Airline
Subsidiaries' operations are fully integrated with its airline-re-
lated businesses.
China Southern's State-owned parent, Southern Air Group
Company, which holds a 65.2% stake in the China Southern,
will be replaced by the newly established China Southern Air
Holding Company and assume direct ownership over 100%
State-owned China Northern Airlines and Xinjiang Airlines."'
These three airlines will become subsidiaries of China Southern
Holding Company. The revenue from those routes will be allo-
cated in proportion to the traffic capacity, calculated by refer-
ence to the model of the aircraft, frequency of the flights, and
the seat capacity.
155 China Southern Airlines Co. Profile, available at http://www.cs-air.com/en/
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Gradually, all transport assets and relevant personnel of China
Northern Airlines and Xinjiang Airlines will be separated into
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. Finally, China Southern Air-
lines Co., Ltd. will have a fleet of 180 aircraft and 660 routes.'"'
3. China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd.
China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. ("China Eastern"), incorpo-
rated in April 1995 as a joint stock company, is one of the three
major airlines in China. 162 The fleet of China Eastern Airlines
includes more than 60 large and medium size aircraft, mostly
Airbus and Boeing. It has formed a network, with the center in
Shanghai, radiating to the whole country, and linking to Asia,
Europe, America, and Australia.' 63 China Eastern is the first
Chinese airline to be publicly listed in New York, Hong Kong,
and Mainland China.1 64
China Eastern accounted for approximately 16.9% of the total
commercial air traffic handled by Chinese airlines in 2001.165
China Eastern operates primarily from Shanghai's Hong Qiao
International Airport and Pudong International Airport. The
primary focus of China Eastern's business is the provision of do-
mestic, Hong Kong regional, and international passenger airline
services. In 2001, China Eastern operated over 1,722 scheduled
flights per week (excluding charter flights), serving a route net-
work that covers 76 cities within China and abroad.16 Also in
2001, the company operated approximately 200 routes-142 do-
mestic, 13 routes to and from Hong Kong, and 45 international
routes. 167
China Eastern, its subsidiaries, and its branches are located in
Eastern and Northern China with more than 40 sales offices all
over the country. 168 China Eastern also constructed the holding
company of China Cargo Airlines with China Ocean Shipping
Company (COSCO). It merged with China General Aviation
161 Id.
162 China Eastern Airlines Co. Introduction, available at http://www.ce-air.









Company successfully and made the scale of the company
larger.'13
According to the Scheme of Restructure, the new parent,
CEAHoldings, will first take over its original parent company-
Eastern Air Group Company, which owns 61.64% of China East-
ern.1 71 CEAHoldings will later assign all transport assets and rel-
evant personnel of China Northwest and Yunnan Airlines to
China Eastern. Thus, China Eastern will have a fleet of 142 air-
craft and 386 routes when the takeover is complete.' 7'
E. COMPETITION ISSUES AND CONSUMERS' RIGHTS
The lack of legal intervention in competition and the admin-
istrative intervention of the CAAC sometimes restricts the vitality
of the airlines and damages the consumers' interests. Adminis-
trative intervention, more often than not, is used by the CAAC
to artificially raise ticket fares or ban discounts launched by indi-
vidual airline companies in order to obtain a larger market
share. For example, the airline pricing policies adopted by asso-
ciated companies since April 1, 2001, are a typical example of
how the CAAC steps in when airline companies' ticket fares fail
to meet CAAC requirements. 72 To save losses that plagued the
entire industry, the administration demanded that 15 airline
companies sell airline tickets at a set price. 7 3 Such a non-mar-
ket price policy, if not altered and modified, will continue to
discourage competition within the sector. It is unpredictable to
what extent the Government will assert influence over the Chi-
nese airline industry when the takeovers are finished and the
CAAC only acts as an industry regulator.
The takeovers among these airlines might reduce consumer
choices and ultimately increase airfares or commit a predatory
act in pricing due to less competitors or lack of competition. It
is necessary for the relevant organizations such as the consum-
ers' associations to play a more active role in such kinds of activi-
ties. However, the top priority might be more legislation on the




172 At that time, the CAAC issued a notice, forbidding airlines to sell discounts
on some routes.
173 Demand, available at http://news.sohu.com/19/24/ews147322419.shtml
(last ,isited Sept. 1, 2003).
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the final 20 years of the last century, China experienced an
economic boom. China has been transferring from a highly
concentrated economy to a market economy, which has made it
possible to adjust the natural resources in her economy, includ-
ing the restructuring of China's many State-owned enterprises.
Spurred by the growing globalization and China's entry into
the World Trade Organization, a wave of takeovers is expected
among the enterprises in China. Through takeovers, many do-
mestic industries might become strong enough to compete with
their foreign counterparts.
In the airline industry, takeovers of Chinese airlines reflect
the change in the Government's policy to raise the efficiency of
the industry, thus stimulating the industry's healthy develop-
ment. However, China should also notice experience and the
legal framework of takeovers occurring outside China. It seems
to the authors that law and regulations can play an important
role in the takeover activities and can create a better environ-
ment for free competition.
On one hand, China should develop a legal framework on
takeovers involving more transparency and coherence, and offer
competitors equal opportunities to do business. On the other
hand, China must establish a set of domestic procedural re-
quirements regarding the notification of mergers, such as
thresholds, timetables, quantity, and quality of information re-
quired, and the uniformity of filing criteria. Last but not least, it
is suggested that China should draft or amend the existing com-
petition law to include provisions such as those in the EU. Fur-
ther, China should establish a national trade commission as a
watchdog to supervise takeovers, including those in the airline
industry.
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